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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of right filed pursuant to Rule 3 URAP from a
grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee and a denial of
Summary Judgment against Appellant by the Third Judicial District
Court entered on February 5,2010 appeal filed March 2,2010.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the court correctly rule that Appellee was not a tenured employee of
Draper City at the time he was terminated and thus not entitled to pre-
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termination due process rights including notice of charges, explanation of
evidence and opportunity to present employee's side of story?
2. The standard of review of the lower courts grant of summary judgment is
for correctness, according no deference to the lower court's legal conclusion,
and accepting the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
losing party." Macris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999), Oman v. Davis Sch, Dist 194 P. 3d 1956 (Utah 2008).

STATUTES, AND RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE
1. Sections 10-3-1105 UCA& 10-3-1106 See Appendix.l &2
2. Section 3020 Probationary Employment Period Draper City Rules and
Regulations

MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
Because this is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, where
the court accepts the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing
party, there are essentially no negative facts to marshal. However, the core issue
being whether Appellants temporary employment status was extended within
Draper City rules prior to his one year anniversary date, the only arguably

significant facts, which could be marshaled to show that appellants temporary
status had been extended, are the affidavit of Lt. Russell A. Adair where he
indicates that he verbally informed appellant of the extension (R. pp.86-87, see
also pp 151-152)) together with Sgt. Chad Carpenters Performance Appraisal
which indicates that Sgt. Carpenter "recommends" that Appellants probationary
employment be extended (R. p. 151).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court on motions for
Summary Judgment where Appellee's Motion was granted and Appellants denied.
1. Appellant was originally hired by the Draper City Police Department on
October 16,2006 (R. p. 187).
2. Following a one year probationary period, in February of 2008 Appellant
was delivered a Personnel Action Form indicating that he had been
approved by the Chief of Police and the City Manager as a Permanent
employee and showing an effective date of November 4,2007 (R. p 3.)
3. On March 3,2008 Appellant was verbally terminated and told and that as
a probationary employee he was not entitled to be advised of the reason
for his termination or to a hearing requiring the Department to justify his
termination as required by the Draper City Rules and Regulations. (R. p 1

complaint paragraph 8 Admitted by Appellee's Answer R.p.7 paragraph
8).
4. Following written demand for reinstatement and hearing (R. p. 4) on May
1,2008 Appellant initiated this action seeking an Order declaring that at
the time of Appellants termination that he was a Permanent Employee
entitling Appellant to the procedures and protection set forth in the
Draper City Code as well as UCA sections 78B-6-401 and 78B-6-408 (R.
complaint pp. 1-2).
5. On November 5,2008 Appellant filed a Motion and Memorandum in
support of Summary Judgment (R. pp. 14-17) that was Opposed by
Appellee on December 8,2008 (R. pp. 28-40) and denied by the court
without hearmg on March 16,2008 finding "This suit is dependent on the
fact of whether Plaintiff was a permanent employee or an at-will
probationary employee when he was terminated." (R. p. 46).
6. Following a period of discovery Appellee, on January 19,2010, filed a
Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment which was
executed on December 15,2009 (R. pp 292-300), the motion was
opposed by Appellant on January 4,2010 (R. pp. 283-291).
7. On February 5,2010 the Court without hearing granted Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. pp. 307-311) finding that there were
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no genuine issues of fact to dispute that Appellant's temporary
employment status was extended on September 23,2007 when appellant
had been given verbal notice of an extension of probation by Lt. Adair
(R.p.307, Adair affidavit R. p. 87 at para. 3) and further that appellant on
September 28, 2009 had been informed that his Sgt. was recommending
the extension of probation.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court committed reversible error when it ruled that there were no genuine
issue of fact to dispute that Appellant's temporary employment status had been
extended, thus not entitling Appellant to a pre-disciplinary termination hearing
with appeal rights.

ARGUMENT
Although the district court erred when it denied Appellants motion for
summary judgment (R. p. 46-48) it correctly assessed the controlling issue of the
litigation when it ruled that "This suit is dependent on the fact of whether Plaintiff
was a permanent employee or an at-will probationary employee when he was
terminated." (R. p. 46). The court denied appellants motion finding that Appellee
had raised sufficient issues of fact to contradict the declaration of Appellant that
"although he had been told by his Sgt that he was recommending an extension of
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the probationary period he was also told that he would receive "written notice
setting forth the reason and length of extension" (R. p. 27 para, 7). The fact that he
was told he would receive "written notice" by his Sgt is consistent with the
requirement of the City to extended probationary employment. The fact issues
raised by Appellee and relied upon by the court in denying Appellants motion for
summary judgment were the Affidavit of Mac Connole which did not contradict or
deny appellants statement that no written notice was provided regarding the alleged
extension of his probation or that the extension of probation was approved by the
City manager (R. p. 35 para. 6), the Affidavit of Hazel Dunsmore, claiming her
mistake in the preparation of a Personnel Action Form (R. p. 36) again not
disputing that the City had failed to inform Appellant of the extension of his
probationary employment as required by the city rules, and lastly, a Draper City
Police Department personnel evaluation form (R. pp. 39-41)

indicating that

Appellants Supervisor informed Appellant that he was "recommending" an
extension of probation. This recommendation is only the first step required by
Section 3020 and requires the approval of the Department Head, the City Manager
and the issuance of a letter informing the employee of the reason for the extension
and the length of the extension.
The Rules and Regulations of the Draper City Police Department set forth
the procedure to be followed by the Department to approve and confirm permanent
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employment status and the manner in which probationary employment may be
extended provide:

Section 3020 PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT PERIOD
General Policy Statement
Al employees, both full and part-time, are required
to complete Probationary Employment Periods. The first 180
calendar days of employment after hire or change or status are
considered to be the "Probationary Employment Period"
During this period of time, the employee's potential for
successful performance will be closely examined. It is expected
that the employee will also evaluate the City and position in
term of his or her own personal needs. Employees are
considered at-will during the Probationary Employments Period
and may be terminated with or without cause during such time.
3. Probationary Employment: Upon completion of
the Probationary Employment Period, recommendation of the
Department Head, and approval of the City Manager, an
employee will become a full time or part time employee in the
position for which he or she is serving. The Department Head
shall notify the employee of the new status and document the
event with a Personnel Action Form.
4. Written Notice of Extension. Upon the
recommendation of the supervisor and approval of Department
Head and the City Manager, the Probationary Employment
Period may be extended when the original period is not
adequate for the satisfactory assessment of an employee's
performance. In such event, the employee will receive written
notification of the reason for and length of the extension.

Public bodies are required to comply with their own rules and regulations
and employees are entitled to rely on those rules Lucas v. Murray City Civil
Service Comm. 949 R2d 746, 754 (Ut. App. 1997), citing Bell v. Civil Serv.
Comm% 515 N.E.2d248,252 (1987).
8

There can be no dispute that written notice, after approval of the Department
Head and City Manager, is required before a Draper city employee's probation
may be extended (Section 3020 above). The ruling of the court in this case
impermissibly and erroneously ignores the obligation of the city to comply with its
own rules and regulations in the following particulars; a) there is no evidence that
appellant was ever provided Written Notice of the reason for and length of any
extension contradicting Appellants Declaration where he indicates that although he
was told that his employment would be extended he was also told that he would
receive written notice and the length of his extension (R. p. 27 paras. 7 & 8), b)
although the Department Head (chief of police Mac Connole) submitted an
affidavit indicating that he was aware "that in late September, Daniel Van Beuge
was informed that, due to job performance issues his probationary status was being
extended for six months."(R. p. 35 p.2 para.6) said affidavit does not establish
compliance with Section 3020 because it does not aver that written notice was
every provided Appellant, that the extension was approved by the City Manager, or
that the alleged verbal notice of Lt Adair on September 23, 2007 (R. p. 87 para 3)
was even approved by the affiant chief of police. Interestingly enough the
supposed verbal notice of extension provided by Lt. Adair on the 23rd precedes the
recommendation of extension by Appellant's supervisor on September 28,2007 by
five days. This inconsistent time period could reasonable cause one to consider the
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veracity of Lt. Adair's affidavit in light of the fact that Appellants personnel
evaluation had not been completed and a recommendation for extension of
probationary employment had not yet been made.
The district court's ruling that there are no issues of fact regarding the
extension of Appellants probationary employment is not only not supported by the
evidence, which must be viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, Maoris &
Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), it is clearly opposite
to what the undisputed evidence establishes, and that is that Appellee did not
comply with its own regulations regarding the procedural requirement to extend an
employee's probationary period.

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment entered in favor of Appellee, based on afindingthat
Appellee had complied with its rules and regulation in extending Appellants
probationary employment, must be reversed and remanded with an Order requiring
the court to grant Appellants motion for Summary Judgment.

r
DATED this^Pday of June 2010
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Appendix 1

APPENDIX ONE
10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment
— Exceptions.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension
of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising
executive power in the municipality;
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is
a member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city;
(c) a police chief of the municipality;
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality;
(e) a fire chief of the municipality;
(f) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality;
(g) a head of a municipal department;
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department;
(i) a superintendent;
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality;
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or
(1) a seasonal employee of the municipality.
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a
municipality's ability to define cause for an employee termination or reduction in
force.
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APPENDIX TWO
10-3-1106, Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board

— Procedure.
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing
body, or heads of departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without
pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less
remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b),
appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to
be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before
appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice
of the appeal with the municipal recorder within 10 days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance
procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal
recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully
hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge,
suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer
may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall
be certified to the recorder within 15 daysfromthe date the matter is referred to it,
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except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the
employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged or suspended without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was
transferred to a position of less remuneration.
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court
of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6Xa) shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals1 review shall be on the record of the appeal board and
for the
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board,
the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure
for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a
council-mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
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